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NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File

Apr 59 SA/KK jlu

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 CODEWORD ROUTING SHEET

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief, Support Staff, OCI		
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FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	Acting Chief, Control Staff, ORR		29 Apr 59
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3			

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|--------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Approval | <input type="checkbox"/> Information | <input type="checkbox"/> Signature |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> Comment | <input type="checkbox"/> Preparation of Reply | <input type="checkbox"/> Dispatch |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Concurrence | <input type="checkbox"/> Recommendation | <input type="checkbox"/> File |

REMARKS:

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Please forward the attached material to
 ORR Representative, [REDACTED]

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APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL

Appended document contains classified information within
 the meaning of Section 798, Title 18, United States Code.

ODS

ENTIRE DOCUMENT

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**(EXTREMELY)
BAD**

ORIGINALS

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
27 March 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, PROD-O

FROM : Chief, CIA Liaison Staff

SUBJECT : The 11th Plenary Session of CEMA (6E-285)

1. The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) is an intelligence target of basic importance from the standpoint of a U.S. need for particular information regarding (a) the direction, tempo and degree of economic planning in the Soviet Bloc; (b) details about planning for critical industrial production such as assignment of production facilities and quotas for military goods production; (c) the role of CEMA as a control over the Satellites by the USSR; (d) possible differing views of individual Satellites toward CEMA economic policy; (e) the particular participation in CEMA by the Chinese Communists; and (f) particular activities by CEMA in implementing Soviet Bloc arrangements for trade and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries.

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5. Priority processing and dissemination are requested.
Preliminary answers are desired.

FOR THE CIA COMINT OFFICER:

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
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ORR GUIDE REQUIREMENTS FOR REPORTING BY ASAE

The following guide requirements have been prepared by ORR as reporting guidance to ASAE in the selection of trade and transportation and internal conditions information. These requirements are in priority order, but include only those selected priority requirements which this office believes are of sufficient importance to the economic intelligence effort to justify a continuation of this type of field reporting. Should it be necessary to reduce the processing effort of ASAE it is believed that such a reduced effort should not only reflect these priorities, but take the following form: (1) a reduction of detailed reporting in favor of the production of key messages either issued individually or in some bi-weekly issuance; (2) to the degree possible, a continuation of such reporting against all of these topics rather than the complete elimination of any particular effort. These priority topics which are expanded below are as follows: (I) SovBloc Activities in the Underdeveloped Countries; (II) Intra-Bloc Trade; (III) East-West Trade; and (IV) Local Conditions.

I. Soviet Bloc Trade With and Technical Assistance to Underdeveloped Countries



A. Discussions related to Bloc obtained projects in underdeveloped countries or related to those projects for which bids have been placed.

B. Prices for projects quoted to underdeveloped countries and any information which indicates how these prices are determined.

C. Discussions which indicate any degree of cooperation among Bloc countries in bidding for a project in an underdeveloped country; any indications of competition between Bloc countries for a project.

D. Difficulties encountered by the Bloc in implementing a project for which a contract has been signed; difficulties which prevent a Bloc country from bidding on a project.

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
E. Financial arrangements which describe how the underdeveloped country is to pay for services and materials provided by the Bloc country.

F. Information which relates to pricing of commodities exported to the underdeveloped country which are required to implement a project; pricing of commodities, if applicable, exported by the underdeveloped country to pay for a project.

G. Numbers and specializations of Bloc technicians utilized in implementing a construction project in an underdeveloped country.

H. Salaries, working conditions and other costs involved in maintaining Bloc technicians while they are under contract in the underdeveloped country.

II. Intra-Bloc Trade



A. Any materials involved in USSR/satellite trade with Communist China.

B. Intra-Sino-Soviet Bloc country trade in all nonferrous commodities.

III. East-West Trade

Because the East-West trade data is relatively available from Western sources, reporting by ASIAE should be on a highly selective basis within this field.

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
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A. Elec-West trade in all nonferrous commodities except aluminum, lead, zinc, tin, and copper wire, as specified below. Trade in other forms of copper should continue to be reported for at least six months and perhaps a year, until it can be determined whether there is a significant shift in the type of copper purchased by the Elec from the West following the change in the embargo status of copper. The type or form of copper purchased by a country may indicate something about the status and/or capability of the copper industry in the purchasing country. Offers to buy or sell need not be reported.

B. Indications of movements of machine tools, metalworking machinery, electrotechnical equipment (electrical and electronic), bearings, chemical machinery and equipment. Trade in these items, particularly imports, helps to alert us to equipment needs and possible vulnerabilities. Export listings with quoted prices, specific types and model numbers of these machines and equipment.

C. Any data on gold sales.

IV. Local Conditions



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MEMO TO: [REDACTED]

4 December 1958

FROM : [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Reduced Capabilities of ASAE to Prepare
Collated Economic Reports

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1. Army Security Agency, Europe, [REDACTED] has asked us for a comprehensive updating of economic requirements, informing us that they face a substantial personnel reduction and wish to cut their production intelligently. This raises a number of problems which we hope you can help us with. We attach samples of the ASAE reports.

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2. Strategic Branch, and in fact the whole [REDACTED] has almost no requirement for these reports. The level of reporting is extremely detailed, and analysis of this material would greatly divert us from our primary task of improving collection. We do not know, however, what use is made of these reports in ORR and have therefore postponed a response to ASAE until we can hear from you.

3. First, do these reports reach ORR? Through what channels? Are they unique, or are they duplicated by NSA publications? Does NSA publish the same information in individual message form?

4. Second, has ORR laid economic requirements upon ASAE, either directly or through NSA? Has ORR also been requested recently to review such requirements?

5. Third, assuming that the ASAE output of collated reports is unique and worthwhile, and that ORR has not laid on new requirements recently, can ORR prepare new requirements at this time? Apart from new and additional requirements, ASAE must be given some priority rankings reflecting our relative willingness to see certain types of reporting cut out. One way to do this is for ORR to submit new requirements thru regular channels. Another, perhaps even an additional one, is for ORR to send us the requirements for transmittal to ASAE; this has the advantage of personal contact which can be permanently maintained.

6. In brief, given the fact that Strategic's interest as a consumer of these reports is almost nil, and the possibility that ORR get this information from other sources, we would like to know how ORR's interests should be presented to ASAE.

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Distribution:

2 Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100080005-2

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